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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN
PRISON DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS*
Correctional institutions throughout the United States regulate the
day to day lives of approximately two hundred and twenty thousand
convicted felons.1 The responsibility for the control of these inmates
and the security of the penal institutions has been delegated by the
various legislatures to administrative bodies.2 In order to carry out
their delegated responsibility, these administrative bodies have also been
given considerable discretion as to the methods to be used in maintaining order and discipline within the walls of the prisons. 3 The respective
agencies, both state and federal, not only adopt and promulgate rules
governing inmate conduct,4 but also determines the procedures that will
be employed by the agency in handling inmates who have allegedly violated those rules. The agencies establish the methods used to ascertain
whether there has been an infraction of prison regulations5 and whether
increased restraints on an inmate's liberty or other punishments are
necessary because of an infraction.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the Center for Constitutional Rights, 588 Ninth Ave., New York, New York in the preparation of this article.
1. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS,

ENFORCEMENT

AND

ADMINISTRATION

OF

Table 1 (1967).
2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4001, 4002 (1964); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 46-131 (1964
Replacement); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-81 (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.14

(Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 77-307 (1964); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-244 (1948);
IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-239 (1956 Replacement); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.020 (1963);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-829 (Supp. 1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 124 § 1
(1958); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7932 (Cum.Supp. 1968); MONT.REV. CODES ANN. § 801905 (Cum. Supp. 1967); NEV. REV. STAT. § 209.070 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. CORREC.
LAWS § 46 (McKinney 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-11 (Cum.Supp. 1967); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12-47-11 and 12-47-12 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5145.03 (page
Supp. 1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 421.016-(1968) PA. STAT. tit. 61, § 350 (1964); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 55-303 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-9-2 (Supp. 1967); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 28-5-3 (1966).
3. Id.
See, e.g., OKLAHOMA STATE PENITENTIARY MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
GOVERNING INMATE TRUSTEE STATUS 9, 12, 14 regulating conduct with respect to
prison staff. WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR EMPLOYEES
12 (1967) regulating the mailing and censoring of legal documents; STATE OF GEORGIA,

4.

RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE OPERATION OF STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS CAMPS 20 (1968)
prescribing the terminology to

be used by inmates when referring to aspects of prison life; the rules and regulations of
the Rhode Island Penitentiary set out in Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 at 871874 (D.R.I. 1970).
5. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS POLICY STATEMENT 7400.6 (1966); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 944.27, 28 (Supp. 1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 995.070 and .080
(1961); the procedures of the Missouri State Penitentiary noted in Carothers v. Follette,
314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) and promulgated in MISSOURI STATE PENITENTIARY,
PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLET RULES AND PROCEDURES 1-6 (1967).
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Rules regulating inmate conduct necessarily vary with each correctional authority's concept of how to best preserve internal order and
maintain security within the institutions. The rules of conduct may be
quite broad. Disciplinary action may be taken against an inmate for,
"any conduct not conducive toward rehabilitation or betterment of an
inmate",' or "conduct . . . such as would discredit this institution."7
While the substantive rules of penal institutions vary, the administrative procedures used to handle a disobedient prisoner are somewhat
standard throughout the penal systems. Correctional institutions invariably provide a special confinement facility for those inmates who
are guilty of serious infractions. This special facility is generally known
as solitary confinement, although it may also be referred to as segregative confinement, punitive segregation, or a maximum security cell.
Regardless of the name, its purposes are to segregate inmates dangerous
to prison security and to deter inmates from misconduct. The intensity
of the strictures needed to effect these purposes depends upon the recalcitrance of the inmate. Lesser penalties, such as denial of creature
comforts, are imposed for less serious rule infractions. With a view
toward the positive aspect of rule enforcement, most correctional systems provide a "good time" or "gain time" incentive.s Time is credited
to an inmate's total sentence for each specified period of time he actually serves without having any disciplinary action taken against him.
For example, the federal system allows deduction from the term of the
sentence (of from five to ten days) for each month served. 9 Where an
inmate has accumulated good time credit on his record, the total credit
may be reduced by a forfeiture of it imposed as punishmemnt for misbehavior."' Not only may earned good time be forfeited, but moreover,
the inmate may be prohibited from earning further good time as a result
of disciplinary action."
"These, together with adverse parole recommendations, are the main traditional disciplinary tools in institutions."1 2
The use of these tools depends, of course, on whether a prisoner is
found to have violated prison rules.
The fact of the violation may be determined by either the warden
alone or by a disciplinary committee composed of members of the prison
6. TENNNESSEE STATE PENITENTIARY, GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR PRISONERS 7.
7. MAINE STATE PRISON, INFORMATIONAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR INMATES
42, 43.
8. The Federal Bureau of Prisons and all states except Kansas, Utah and Louisiana have statutes providing for good time credit.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1964).
10. Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
11. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
12. CORRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 50.
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staff. The procedures that will be followed depend upon the agency
responsible for the correctional institution. In the federal system, an
inmate facing a forfeiture of good time should be allowed: a hearing
before a committee authorized to impose the punishment; a summarized
record of the hearing; notice at the hearing of the details of the alleged
misconduct; an opportunity to make a statement on his own behalf if he
pleads guilty; assistance of a staff member if the inmate chooses to plead
not guilty; notice of the final decision in his case; and an opportunity to
appeal that decision to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons by uncensored mail.13 These provisions are similar to those used in the Missouri
State Penitentiary, however, appeal is made to an authority within the
prison and the Missouri prisoner is allowed to present evidence in rebuttal.1 4 Wisconsin has also initiated procedures that are substantially
the same as those in the federal system. 5 As has been pointed out, the
use of a hearing is not the only method of dealing with the inmate.
The warden of a federal penitentiary may overturn the finding of the
disciplinary committee, "if warranted by the evidence and if approThe independent conclusion of the
priate under the circumstances."'"
warden of how best to dispose of the matter is also permissible in Missouri.

17

In the past, courts have generally refused to review disciplinary acThe reasonableness of the administrative action within the prisons.'
to
be a matter beyond the scope of judicial
been
considered
tion has
inquiry. This deference accorded the discretion and expertise of the
correctional authority has been manifested by a number of rationales.
In Roberts v. Pegelow,19 a Black Muslim inmate of a federal penitentiary received two weeks loss of amusement privileges and forfeited sixty days of accumulated good time for eating "on the wrong
mess." The inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging
the disciplinary action as arbitrary. In affirming the district court's denial of the petition, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to
consider whether the infraction reasonably justified the punishment.
The court stated that:
'13.
14.
15.

U.S. BuREAu OF PRISONS POLICY STATEMENT 7400.6 at 1-4 (1966).
Supra, note 5.
See, Comment, Administrative Fairness in Corrections, 1969 Wisc. L. Rev. 587

at 589.
16. Supra, note 13 at 2.
17. Supra, note 5.
18. Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963); Siegal v. Ragen, 180 F.2d
785 (7th Cir. 1950); United States ex rel Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir.

1956); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952); Lowe v. Hiatt, 77 F. Supp.

303 (M.D. Pa. 1948), cert. den., 337 U.S. 44 (1949).
19. 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963).

112
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[S]o long as the punishment imposed for an infraction of the
rules is not so unreasonable as to be characterized as vindictive,
cruel or inhuman, there is no right of judicial review to it...
Such questions have consistently been held to be nonjusticiable,
for routine security measures and disciplinary action rest solely
within the discretion of the20 prison officials and their superiors in
the Executive Department.
In Siegal v. Ragen21 a state prisoner alleged that the warden of the
state prison had deprived him of rights secured by the United States
Constitution: (1) by abolishing a legal department set up by the
prisoner, (2) by mismanaging a prisoner's amusement fund and (3)
by imposing isolated confinement on the prisoner for criticizing the
warden. The Seventh Circuit concluded that none of the warden's actions deprived the prisoner of a right secured by the Constitution, and
that their only redress at this point must be sought from the state
courts. The court observed that control and regulation of internal discipline of state penal institutions was a power reserved to the state.22
Another doctrine used by the courts to avoid interfering with prison
discipline is the concept of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
This is true only where the petition seeks habeas corpus, as opposed to
injunctive relief under 42 USC § 1983.23 For example, in Lowe v.
Hiatt,24 the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania considered a federal prisoner's objections to the treatment he received in
prison. The prisoner's record indicated, "clearly that he entered the
institution with an avowed intention of refusing to comply with the
prison regulations. '25 The federal prisoner was not without administrative relief in view of the establishment of a "prisoner mail box." This
was a procedure through which inmates might write letters, uncensored
in the institution, to the Director of the Bureau.2 6 Since the prisoner
had failed to pursue this administrative remedy, his petition for habeas
corpus was denied.
The reluctance of federal courts to interfere with prison discipline is
supported by dicta of other cases. While holding that a prisoner's
presence during the appeal of his conviction was not a matter of con20.

Id. at 550.

21.

190 F.2d 785.

22.

Id. at 788.

23.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The civil rights act of 1871, does not always require ex-

haustion of administrative remedies.
(1963).
24.
25.

Supra, note 18.
Id. at 305.

26.

Id.

McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668
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stitutional right but of appellate court discretion, the United States Supreme Court in Price v. Johnson2" stated that, "lawful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges
and rights, a restriction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system." 2 8 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus in Williams v. Steele.29 The dismissal was based on the ground that despite allegations of mistreatment
in the petition, the appellant set forth facts indicating that he was lawfully held in custody. The court went on to say that even were they to
have habeas corpus jurisdiction, they could not provide redress for the
mistreatment complained of by the petitioner. The court stated that,
[S]ince the prison system of the United States is entrusted to the
Bureau of Prisons under the Attorney General . . . the courts

have no power to supervise the discipline of prisons nor to interfere
with their discipline ... .
It has been suggested that this statement gave the initial impetus to
the tendency of federal courts to refrain from interfering in the administration of prison discipline. 3' This "Hands-off Doctrine" appears
to have retained its vitality in the Eighth Circuit. In the recent case of
Burns v. Swenson3 2 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with
the question of whether certain procedural regulations of the Missouri
State Penitentiary were constitutionally required. The state correctional
authority had made provision for: notice of a misconduct charge
against a prisoner; a hearing on the charge before a committee of at
least three persons; representation by counsel or a counsel substitute
in serious cases; disclosure of the evidence against the inmate; and a
written summary of the committee's decision with the opportunity for
formal review. 33 Inmate Burns was suspected of participating in a
murderous assault. He had been identified by one eyewitness. Because Bums had already had disciplinary action taken against him in the
past and was regarded by the prison administration as a "troublemaker and a behind the scenes agitator,"34 the warden removed Burns
to a maximum security cell without taking any formal action against
27.
28.
29.
30.

334 U.S. 266 (1948).
Id. at 285.
194 F.2d 32.
Id. at 34.

31.

Gallington, Prison Disciplinary Decisions; 60
152 (1969).
430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970).
Id.
Id. at 775.

NOLOGY AND POLICE SCIENCE

32.
33.
34.

JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMI-
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him. 35 Approximately six months later Bums appeared before an ad
hoc policy committee which reviewed the warden's action. Normally,
such action is considered by a statutorily authorized Prison Classification Committee.3 6 No record of the proceedings was made other
than a simple affirmance of the warden's decision and a notation that the
inmate was recommitted to the maximum security cell indefinitely. Approximately one year thereafter his status was again reviewed, though
this time by the Prison Classification Committee. No change resulted.
A third review of the prisoner's assignment was eventually made, although he was not present at this final review. His total segregative
confinement lasted slightly more than three years.
In considering Bums' allegation that the warden violated his Fourteenth Amendment right by suspending the normal procedure established by the state, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the normal procedures, while penologically desirable, were not constitutionally necessary.37 The Court of Appeals reasoned that:
[F]ederal court review of state prisoner's complaints arising out
of the internal administration, conditions, or discipline in the prison
is narrowly circumscribed. Unless deprivation of constitutional
dimensions are involved, Federal courts should be loathe to interfere.
In the present posture of the suit, the degree to which prison officials may have departed from desirable procedures or state standards cannot be magnified into a fundamental
constitutional error
38
mandating a decree from this tribunal.
It is apparent that many courts are of the opinion that the considerations of administering our penal systems justify the withdrawal of many
procedural due process rights guaranteeing the fairness of disciplinary
action taken by the prison administration.
Not all aspects of the administration of internal control and security
are beyond the scope of judicial review. Federal courts have recognized and have exercised their power to correct abuses of administrative authority where they have been found to be unconstitutional. It
seems clear that courts will not deter to the discretion of prison authorities where the courts find a violation of the Eighth Amendment.3 9 Nei35. Inmate classification and assignment to maximum security cells is usually
handled by a statutorily established committee. Mo. REV. STAT. § 216.212 (1959).
36. Id.
37. 430 F.2d at 775.
38. Id. at 776.
39. See, e.g. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) requiring safeguards surrounding the imposition of corporeal punishment in order to keep it within
the bounds of the Eighth Amendment; Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D.
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ther may an inmate's right to free exercise of his religion be unduly
restricted because of the necessity for good order within the prison."
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has served
to invalidate prison practices of segregating prisoners on the sole basis
of race. 4 State penal institutions have been prevented from interfering
with a prisoner's access to the courts despite the argument that providing access inhibits the effective preservation of prison order.4 2 In
determining whether prison practices are unconstitutional, the courts
have consistently considered the obvious necessity for discipline
within the institution and the policy of previous decisions leaving the
means of effecting that discipline to the administrative authority. Nevertheless, the judicially enunciated list of a prisoner's constitutional
rights has been enlarged.
The Constitutional protections 43 relate not only to the methods of
punishing regulation violations and of controlling inmate conduct, but
also to the procedural processes used by the correctional authority to
determine whether imposition of any punishment is justified. While it
had previously been noted that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment followed the individual into prison and protected him from
unconstitutional action carried out under color of state law,44 only recently have cases held that a prisoner is entitled to certain elements of
procedural due process before he may be subjected to prison discipline.4 5 Federal courts have differed, however, in their interpretations
Cal. 1966), enjoining the state from holding prisoners in the prison solitary confine-

ment unit, the conditions of which were found to be violative of the Eighth Amendment.
40. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2nd Cir. 1964), in which the court
declared that, "a prisoner has only such rights as can be exercised without impairing
the requirements of prison discipline." p. 908. It went on to hold that allegations that
prison officials violated the petitioners First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion raised a justiciable issue; Pierce, Sostre, SaMarion v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233
(2nd Cir. 1961), rejecting the argument that prison disciplinary actions were executive

action and that therefore allegations of First Amendment violations by the warden did
not raise justiciable issues.
41. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), alfd per curiam 390
U.S. 333 (1968).
42. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) held that prison regulations attempting

to prevent one inmate from assisting another in the preparation of petitions of habeas
corpus were invalid because they constituted an unjustified interference with a prisoner's

right to seek redress under 28 U.S.C. § 2242.
43.

The Fourteenth Amendment reads in part,

"...

nor shall any State deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .

. ."

U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV. The Fifth Amendment binds the federal government with respect to due
process. That Amendment reads in part, ". . . nor shall any person . . . , be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . ."
U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
44. Jackson v. Goodwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
45. Sostre v. Rockefeller, supra, note 11; Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014

(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kritsky v. McGinnis, supra, note 10.

The above cases were brought
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of what elements of procedural due process must be present.4 6
In Sostre v. Rockefeller4" the state prisoner was confined in punitive
segregation indefinitely for refusing to cease communicating with his
attorney about matters which the warden felt were not directly related
to the prisoner's case, and for refusing to answer the warden's questions
about an oganization mentioned in Sostre's letters. Neither of the
grounds for imposing the punishment constituted a violation of prison
regulations, nor was Sostre charged with any such violation. During the
time that the inmate remained in punitive segregation he was unable to
earn good time credit.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York found
that the prisoner had no prior written notice of any charge against
him; that no record of the discussions between the prisoner and the
warden was made; that the prisoner was not charged with any violence,
with attempting to escape, with inciting to riot, or with any similar
charge; and that the prisoner remained in punitive segregation for more
than a year. The district court also found:
[T]hat punitive segregation under the conditions to which plaintiff
was subjected . . . is physically harsh, destructive of morale, de-

humanizing in the sense that it is needlessly degrading, and dangerous to the maintenance of sanity when continued for more than a
short period of time .... 48
As a result of this confinement, Sostre lost one hundred and twenty four
and one third days of good time which might otherwise have hastened
his consideration for parole.4 9
In considering the plaintiffs allegation that the warden's actions constituted a violation of the plaintiffs right to procedural due process, the
court purported to follow:
[T]he firmly established due process principle that where governmental actions may seriously injure an individual, and the reasonableness of that action depends on fact findings, the evidence used
to prove the government's case must be disclosed to the individual
so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. The individual must also have the right to retain counsel. The decisionmaker's conclusion must rest solely on the evidence adduced at the
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while the cases following the traditional "hands off" approach
to prison disciplinary action were predominately habeas corpus actions. Supra, note 18.
However, the type of relief sought should not be determinative of the disposition of
the constitutional issue.
46. Compare cases cited in note 45, supra, with Burns v. Swenson, supra, note 32.
47. Supra, note 11.
48. Id. at 868.

49.

Id. at 872.
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hearing. In this connection, the decision-maker should state the
reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence upon which
he relied.

Finally . . . an impartial decision-maker is essential. 50

In light of this principle, the court held that before the prisoner
could have been confined to punitive segregation he should have been
given: (1) advance written notice of the charges against him designating the prison rule violated; (2) a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker at which the prisoner could confront his accusers and call witnesses on his own behalf; (3) a written record of the hearing, decision
and reasons therefore; and (4) the right to retained counsel or a counsel substitute. 5 The court held these procedures must be applied, not
only where the inmate faces punitive segregation but also wherever
good time may be forfeited or the ability to earn it denied. 2
Construing prison disciplinary procedures in this case as subject to
constitutional requirements of basic due process clearly goes beyond the
holdings of previous courts that such matters are non-justiciable.5 3
Rather than defer to administrative expertise and discretion, the district
court in Sostre v. Rockefeller analyzed the effect of the governmental action on the individual, and applied constitutional standards to the action. However, the court in Sostre did indicate that although the issues
raised were of constitutional dimensions there should be an attempt to
obtain redress through administrative channels, as did the court in
Lowe v. Hiatt.54 In Sostre's case though, the higher administrative authority was aware of the warden's actions and had made no response to
them. In the court's opinion, this fact obviated the need for initial formal appeal to that authority.55
With respect to exhaustion of administrative remedies, the district
court in Carothers v. Follette 6 went even further. In that case,
the inmate had not appealed the disciplinary action taken against him
to the Director of Corrections for the state. The Director was not
aware of the disciplinary action. The district court held that a mere
letter to an administrator of state corrections protesting disciplinary action was hardly worthy of classification as an administrative remedy,
and the prisoner need not be required to use this procedure.
The inmate in Carothers was confined in punitive segregation for
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Cases cited note 18, supra.
Id.
312 F. Supp. at 882.
314 F. Supp. 1014.
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making what the warden considered false and lying statements about
the prison administration to the inmate's parents and for failure to comply with restrictions on the prisoner's exercise privileges. The plaintiff
inmate was summoned before a disciplinary board consisting only of
a deputy warden, who acted solely on the report of an officer who had
read the letter to the inmate's parents. On the same date, the plaintiff
was sent to solitary confinement for an indefinite term. He remained
there for four and one half months and was deprived of sixty days of
accumulated good time. The prisoner received no notice of any
charge against him. He was not entitled to any representation. No
record was made of the hearing.
In evaluating the prisoner's claim, under the Civil Rights Act,57
that the procedures used by the prison violated his rights to procedural
due process, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
noted, "that prison officials are not dealing with a group of genteel
citizens noted for their lawabiding characteristics." '
It was also observed that in order to maintain discipline a warden and other personnel should be given flexibility and be allowed to take immediate action where the inmates create violent disorder.5" Those facts notwithstanding, the district court refused to abstain6" and proceeded to apply
federal constitutional standards to the procedures of the prison, and
concluded that:
[D]espite the peculiar and difficult problems in prison administration, we cannot accept defendant's contention that the essential
elements of fundamental procedural fairness-advance notice of
any serious charge and an opportunity to present evidence before a
relatively objective tribunal-must be dispensed with entirely because of the need for summary action or because the administrative problems would be too burdensome.
Although a prisoner does not possess all of the rights of an ordinary
citizen he is still entitled to procedural due process commensurate
with the practical problems of prison life.6 1
The plaintiff spent four and one half months in punitive segregation,
thereby losing the opportunity to earn forty six days of good time and
forfeiting sixty days of accumulated good time. Since the disciplinary
procedures used to effect this loss did not meet the court's concept of
elementary procedural due process under the conditions encountered,
57.
58.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
314 F. Supp. at 1027.

59.

Id. at 1028.

60.
61.

Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1028.

119
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the prisoner had all the lost good time restored to him and the prison
was enjoined from keeping him in solitary confinement. The district
court refrained from ordering the correctional authority to establish fair
and reasonable procedures because the court in Sostre v. Rockefeller
had already done so.6 2
The District Court for the Southern District of New York in Sostre
ordered that the state correctional authority initiate procedures consistent with the holding of the court on the requirements of procedural
due process.6" In approving of this order as fair and reasonable, 4 the
Carotherscourt appeared to go beyond its interpretation of what is absolutely required for constitutional due process in the prison situation.
The Carothers court regarded advance notice of the charges and a
hearing before a relatively objective tribunal to be the minimum procedures necessary. 65 The Sostre concept of the essential elements of procedural due process also includes cross examination, rebuttal evidence,
counsel or a counsel substitute, and a written summary of the proceedings. While Carothers approves of these additional requirements as
fair and reasonable, it does not appear to regard them as essential.
This would be the case unless the Carothers court implicitly included
the additional requirements demanded in Sostre in the Carothers concept of fair hearing.
In this connection the District Court for the Northern District of New
York held, in Kritsky v. McGinnis,6 6 that a hearing must be afforded
the petitioner charged with a serious violation of prison rules; that the
hearing must be meaningful in both time and place; that the decision
reached at the hearing must be a reasoned one; and that the rationale be
recorded.
The inmate in Kritsky had remained in his cell and had refused to
conform to prison routines as a protest against prison policy. He was
summarily removed to a maximum security cell. Ten days later, the inmate was confronted by a prison official who advised the inmate that
he was charged with advocating riot and incendiarism within the prison.
Asked how he pleaded to the charge, the inmate responded not guilty.
He was immediately sentenced to eighteen months of lost good time.
The district court observed that, "firmness and application of quick
and adequate discipline is clearly an essential to safeguard the security
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1029.
312 F. Supp. at 889.
314 F. Supp. at 1029.
Id. at 1028.
Supra, note 10.
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of a large prison and circumvent the start or spread of possible riot and
rebellion." 67 Nevertheless, the court held that since the right to be
heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind is
so fundamental to the basis of our society, the hearing given the inmate
was manifestly insufficient. Procedural due process demanded a meaningful hearing including a recorded rationale of the authority's decision.
The mere fact that some type of hearing was held would not satisfy the
constitutional requirement.
69 and
The petitioners in Sostre,68 Carothers
Kritsky7 ° each suffered
a detrimental effect on their good time credit, either by forfeiting
earned good time or by being unable to earn further good time. Each
petitioner also faced increased restrictions on his present liberty in the
form of a special type of confinement within the prison. Each district
court considering the circumstances surrounding the imposition of punishments on the petitioners concluded that their interests in the proceedings were sufficiently substantial to warrant the use of certain elements of procedural due process. Also, two circuit courts of appeal
have recently considered the issue of whether punitive segregation and
loss of good time are sufficiently harmful to a substantial interest of the
inmate to require specific procedural safeguards at proceedings where
those interests are effected.7 1 The conclusions reached appear to be divergent.
In Nolan v. Scafati,72 the First Circuit Court of Appeals regarded the
issue of procedural safeguards at prison disciplinary hearings to be
difficult and relatively unexplored. 73 The petitioner in the Nolan case
had alleged that his segregated confinement and forfeiture of good
time were imposed in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
He complained of being denied the right of counsel at his hearing, of
cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and of summoning witnesses
in his own behalf. The district court dismissed the complaint,'7 concluding that the need to preserve the executive authority of the warden
and effective maintenance of prison discipline militated against the petitioner's contentions. 75 The district court did, however, indicate that
the guarantee of procedural due process requires that at such a pro67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

313 F. Supp. at 1249.
Supra, note 11.
314 F. Supp 1014.
Supra, note 10.
Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970); Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771.
Supra, note 71.
430 F.2d at 550.
306 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1969).
Id. at 3, 4.
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ceeding the disciplinary board advise the prisoner of the charged misconduct, inform him of the details of the evidence leading to the charge,
allow him to be heard in his own defense, and base its conclusions on
evidence adduced at the hearing.7 6
On appeal, the First Circuit regarded the prisoners allegations to be,
"[S]ufficiently serious. . . , that some determination of the underlying facts should have been undertaken before judgment was rendered." 77
Remanding the case, the court of appeals ordered the district court to:
[A]scertain the cause, nature, and duration of petitioner's confinement; the consequent effect of, if any, on his earned good time
credit; and the nature of the safeguards provided at any prison
hearing which may have been accorded the petitioner."'
Once it had done this, the district court was to then decide whether the
safeguards provided were sufficient to protect any substantial individual
interest that was at stake.7 9 The court explicitly recognized that the
alleged absence of procedures may have resulted in an unconstitutional
violation of the inmate's right to procedural due process.8 0
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Burns v.
Swenson 8 held that notice of the charged misconduct, hearing by a
committee of at least three persons, representation by a counsel or a
counsel substitute, disclosure of evidence against the inmate, a written
summary of the committee's decision, and provision for formal review
were not required by -the Fourteenth Amendment where an inmate faced
punitive segregation and a loss of good time. The summary procedure
alleged by petitioners did not, in the court's opinion, raise the possibility
of a denial of procedural due process sufficient to warrant a hearing on
the charges. The allegations that the First Circuit thought required a
determination of whether the procedural safeguards employed by the
state were sufficient to protect any substantial interest of the inmate
that was at stake were not deemed legally sufficient by the Eighth Circuit. 8 2 In fact, the Eighth Circuit placed controlling emphasis on the
same considerations as the district court did in Nolan v. Scafati.83 The
responsibilities of the prison administrator were brought to the fore
when the Eighth Circuit pointed out that: "[T]he exigencies of un76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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usual or emergency situations dictate that an inmate be unilaterally
segregated first, with a hearing provided later."84 The six month delay in holding the first hearing and the absence of any of the normal
safeguards at that hearing were not considered to be violations of procedural due process. The mere fact that some hearing was held was
sufficient to meet the requirements of procedural due process. The
same fact was found to be insufficient in the eyes of the district court in
Kritsky v. McGinnis."'
The positions of the federal cases discussed above present a fairly
broad spectrum of approaches to the issue of whether prison disciplinary action may effect such substantial individual interests of the inmate that certain elements of procedural due process are required. At
one end of the spectrum are the cases demonstrating the traditional approach that prison discipline is an executive function which requires
flexible and unhampered executive action .8 The exigencies of prison
existence have compelled those courts to find that the administrative
decision to impose restrictions on the inmate should not be surrounded
by procedures which would be present if the decision were rendered
against a free citizen rather than a convicted felon. At the center of the
spectrum is the position taken by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in Nolan v. Scafati. 7 This opinion demonstrates the
possible need for procedural protection where a substantial interest of
the inmate is found to be at stake. The other end of the judicial spectrum is characterized by the recent decisions of the federal district
courts in New York State. 8 8 These courts have found that solitary confinement and loss of good time effect interests substantial enough to
outweigh the governmental interest in conserving administrative resources and preserving prison order and security. In analyzing all the
cases of the spectrum, one cannot help but notice the developing trend.
An exercise of administrative power prompted by suspected acts of the
inmate will be nonetheless subject to current procedural due process
standards on review. The peculiar nature of the environment may not
serve as a factor wholly negating the usual effects of those standards,
but only as a consideration weighed in evaluating the extent to which
procedural protections are constitutionally necessary.
84.

Burns v. Swenson, supra note 32 at 779.
85. Supra, note 10.
86. Cases cited supra, note 18 and the district court opinion in Nolan v. Scafati,
supra note 82.
87. Supra, note 82.
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The cases of Sostre v. Rockefeller,8 9 Carothers v. Follette,9" and
Kritsky v. McGinnis9 each cited and relied on the recent Supreme Court
opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly.9 2 There it was held that New York could
not terminate public assistance payments to an individual without first
granting him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on his eligibility
to receive the payments. The fairness of this hearing should be protected by both timely and adequate notice of the reasons for the proposed termination and an effective opportunity to defend. This opportunity to defend must include the right to cross examine adverse witnesses, to present oral evidence and arguments, to retain an attorney,
93
The Suand to have the hearing before an impartial decision maker.
preme Court regarded the governmental interest in conserving the public fiscal and administrative resources not to be substantial enough to
outweigh the claimant's need to sustain himself through the payments.
A post termination hearing would not realistically protect the claimant's rights because his needs would not wait for the state to have the
hearing."
Goldberg presents the Supreme Court's concept of the procedural
essentials of a fair hearing where governmental action is proposed which
will effect the ability of the individual to fulfill his need for food and
clothing. Before the government can terminate the welfare payments,
it is required to afford the recipient adequate opportunity to substantiate his eligibility. If liberty is considered to be as basic a human need
as food and clothing, then the threat of increased or prolonged restrictions on liberty in the form of solitary confinement or loss of good time
would appear to be as grievious a threat to an individual's interest as
the loss of public assistance payments. On the other hand, the effective
control of the public fiscal and administrative resources would presumably not be as endangered by a procedurally created delay in determination of welfare payments as would the effective maintenance of
prison security be endangered by an inability to quell violence swiftly.
Although arguments against the position that hearing should precede
any disciplinary action by the prison authority are quite compelling,
Goldberg can reasonably be construed to support the position that
while disciplinary action may precede a hearing where the need for celerity is apparent, the action must only restrict inmates' liberty to the ex89.
90.
91.
92.
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tent necessary to preserve immediate order in the prison. Unilateral
action imposing a loss of good time or prolonged solitary confinement
need not always be necessary to preserve order. The procedures listed
in Goldberg would serve to protect the inmates interest in his own liberty while also allowing the correctional authority to make an accurate
determination of facts which might effect that liberty. Where the suspicions on which the correctional authority acted are found at the hearing to be without basis in fact, the inmates could be returned to the
general prison population having suffered no actual loss of good time
credit and as little extra punitive confinement as was possible under the
circumstances.
The Goldberg case was relied on by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Escalera v. New York Housing Authority. 5 That court held
that even if public housing could be considered a privilege, eviction by
the Housing Authority must be preceded by the procedures set out in
Goldberg. The interest of the individual in avoiding the grievous harm
of eviction required that administrative action which could lead to that
harm be surrounded by procedural safeguards to insure it reasonableness. The fact that public assistance might conceivably be considered
a gratuity by the state did not detract from the degree of harm that could
result from its revocation.
Good time credit being an incentive to good prisoner behavior could,
like parole, also be considered as a gratuity or privilege. Although the
inmate may have no vested right in keeping or earning good time credit,
the revocation of any that he has earned and a denial of the opportunity
to earn more compel him to remain incarcerated for a longer period.
Once again, if liberty is considered to be as basic an interest as shelter,
it would appear that present restrictions on future liberty should not
be imposed without the presence of the Goldberg procedures.
Although not dealing specifically with administrative action, two
other Supreme Court cases present analogies to the situation of an inmate facing disciplinary action in the form of punitive segregation and
loss of good time.
In the case of In re Gault,96 the Supreme Court concluded that in respect to proceedings to determine deliquency, proceedings which may
result in commitment of a juvenile to a state institution, the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the juvenile be given:
(1) factual notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to confront and
95.

425 F.2d 853 (2nd Cir. 1970).

96.

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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cross-examine adverse witnesses; (3) access to counsel; and (4) the
privilege against self-incrimination. The particular juvenile court in
this case possessed virtually unlimited discretion in conducting the hearing and determining whether commitment of the juvenile defendant was
warranted. This discretion could not be allowed in view of the gravity
of the possible consequences to the minor were it to be misused. The
procedures serve to protect against arbitrary determinations.
Although the Court's attention was not focused on the post adjudicative or dispositional process, nor was the authority exercised that of an
administrative body, a number of similarities exist between the minor
defendant in Gault and the inmate facing a loss of good time or punitive segregation. Both are accused of acts warranting imposition of restrictions on liberty. Both face a governmental authority possessed
of wide discretion in making its determinations. The minor is constitutionally entitled to procedures which the felon may not be.97 The
need for swift action in the felon's case should not result in a total denial of procedural safeguards, for swift action need only be used to prevent further disruption while the loss of good time and punitive segregation have a punitive as well as a preventive character. The imposition of punishment may be surrounded by procedural safeguards more
readily than immediate preventive action. Where the punishment takes
the form of restrictions on liberty, Gault indicates that the restrictions
per se require procedural protection in the decision to impose them.
The defendant in Specht v. Patterson"' had been convicted under a
statute carrying a maximum sentence of ten years. State law provided
that after a conviction the trial court was to find whether the convicted
defendant either posed a threat to the community or was a mentally ill
habitual offender. On the basis of this second finding the defendant
could be given an indeterminate sentence of more than ten years. This
finding was not an element of the original crime. The Supreme Court
held that at this hearing the defendant was entitled to the assistance of
counsel, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, to offer evidence, and to be
furnished with a record sufficient to make an appeal meaningful.
It should be noted that this proceeding was not to determine guilt
of a criminal character but was merely to find whether there were facts
sufficient to justify restrictions on liberty not required by the conviction.
When the Specht facts are compared to those of Sostre v. Rockefeller,"9
97. Compare Sostre v. Rockefeller, supra, note 11, with Burns v. Swenson, supra,
note 32.
98. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
99. Supra, note 11.
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Carothers v. Follette,10 and Kritsky v. McGinnis' in which each inmate was placed in punitive segregation and lost good time, it can be
seen that in those cases, as in Specht, the individuals all faced restrictions on liberty greater than those required by their sentences.
The proposition that whenever governmental action of an adjudicative type may seriously injure a substantial interest of an individual the
action must be surrounded by certain elements of procedural due process
is undoubtedly too general to be effectively applied to prison disciplinary
action. That proposition leaves unanswered the questions of what elements of procedural due process must be present and what effect exigencies of the situation may have on their application. The interests
of the government in initiating the action and the effect of the procedural safeguards on those interests must also be considered. It could
not be doubted that prison administrators are subject to the constitutional requirement of due process; 102 however, the extent to which that
concept effects their freedom in disposing of disciplinary matters requires reference to a number of opposing factors. In his concurring
opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,' Mr. Justice Frankfurter enunciated some of the considerations that will determine the extent to which procedural due process is required.
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely effected,
the manner in which it was done, the reason for doing it, the available alternatives to the procedures that were followed, the protection
implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged,
the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished . . .
these are some0 of
the considerations that must enter into the judi4
cial judgment. 1
A prison inmate's interest in disciplinary action that could affect
the conditions or duration of his confinement is similar to the interests
of the petitioners in Goldberg v. Kelly,' In re Gault,"° ' and Specht v.
Patterson.1'0
The Goldberg petitioner faced a loss of welfare payments used to sustain himself. The Gault juvenile faced commitment
to an institution. The Specht petitioner faced confinement for a period
longer than the maximum sentence for the crime he committed. The
prison inmate faces confinement in quarters, the conditions of which
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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may be, "[P]hysically harsh, destructive of morale, dehumanizing in the
sense that it is needlessly degrading, and dangerous to the maintenance
of sanity when continued for more than a short period of time . . ."'011
He may be deprived of the relative freedom enjoyed by the general prison population and of creature comforts normally allowed inmates.
The prisoner may also be subject to a forfeiture of accumulated good
time credit and may be prohibited from earning credit while confined
in security quarters. This last possibility is particularly onerous since
good time may reduce the minimum term of confinement by advancing
consideration for parole and his minimum release date. The inmate's
living conditions and relative liberty are the interests at stake.
The manner in which the inmate's interests may be adversely effected varies considerably. The action may be a summary, as it was in
Sostre v. Rockefeller,'0 9 or it may be surrounded by some procedural
safeguards, 10 though even these may be a sham."' In any event, the
action will have been taken because the administrative authority has
determined that the particular inmate's conduct warrants the imposition
of punitive measures.
The reason for handling the prisoner in any particular manner will
depend upon the circumstances. Where the prisoner has a recod of misconduct and is suspected of violence or incitement to violence, as was the
inmate in Burns v. Swenson,"' immediate removal from the general
prison population would be appropriate. Then again, where a prisoner
with a good conduct record is suspected of conduct prohibited by regulation, though not destructive or dangerous in character, as was the
petitioner in Carothers v. Follette,13 there would be no need for summary procedures. Whatever the inmate's conduct may be characterized as, it will always be least expensive and most convenient to the administrative authority to handle cases as expeditiously as they can.
The available alternatives to any procedures that are followed are
evident from the practices employed by the various correctional authorities. Summary, unilateral action by the warden or a member of his
staff is not the only effective method of dealing with alleged prisoner
108.
109.

110.
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misconduct. The State of Missouri' has enacted fairly extensive disciplinary procedures, as have the states of Wisconsin 1 5 and Rhode Island."16 Presumably, these procedures were not felt to place an unwarranted or abusive burden on the fiscal and administrative resources
of those states. Nor has the Federal Bureau of Prisons found representation, the right to present evidence in rebuttal, to call witnesses, and to
cross-examine adverse witnesses to be too great a strain on the effective
administration of prisons. 1 7 Indeed, not only are procedural safeguards economically and administratively feasible but also are believed
by penologists to be, "an essential ingredient in good discipline."' "
In addition to those factors indicating the possibility and desirability
of disciplinary procedures involving traditional notions of procedural
due process, there must also be considered the nature of the environment
that must be administered. Both the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Burns v. Swenson" 9 and the District Court for the District of
Rhode Island in Nolan v. Scatati" ° emphasized, as have many courts in
the past,' 21 that the administrative body should be able to act to quell
disobedience unhampered by judicial interference, thereby protecting
both prison staff and inmates. However, as the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit pointed out in remanding Nolan v. Scatati,12 the need for
speedy executive action in the prison need not necessarily result in a total
absence of a fair hearing. The effect of the disciplinary action on the
inmate may demand the presence of something more than a summary imposition of the inmate to solitary confinement and forfeiture of good
time. This is not to say that there may be no summary action. An inmate could be confined under conditions intended merely to separate him
from others until formal proceedings could be initiated. If, at a formal
hearing, the authority determined that a rule infraction occurred, the
114. Missouri provides for a report by the officer observing the misconduct containing all details of the offense. The inmate and complaining officer are interviewed
by the officer's supervisor who may dismiss the charge, reprimand the inmate or refer
the case to the disciplinary board. If the case is referred, the inmate is allowed to
present information at the hearing and the inmate is assisted by a member of the
prison staff. A brief rationale of the board's decision is to be given. The decision is
subject to administrative review by the warden and state director of corrections. MsSouRI RULES, supra, note 115 at 1-6.
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subsequent punitive segregation and loss of good time would have the
same punitive effect as if they were immediately imposed. If it were
determined that no rule infraction had been committed, the inmate could
be restored to the general population.
Administrative problems will differ from one correctional system to
another and from one situation to another. It does appear, by analogy
to Goldberg,123 Gault,124 and Specht,1 25 that some hearing is constitutionally required before punitive action is taken. If that hearing is to
be meaningful, it would have to entail the opportunity to defend against
a charge of misconduct to the greatest extent possible without having
the hearing itself become a danger to prison discipline. In order to
insure the constitutionality of any hearing held, a summarized record
of that determination must be kept for judicial review, for whether any
procedural safeguards provided by the prison are sufficient to insure
the reasonableness of determinations effecting good time and punitive
segregation will depend on a judicial determination of how effectively
those procedures protected the personal interests at stake.' 2 6
Joseph P. Condon

123. Supra, note 92.
124. Supra, note 96.
125. Supra, note 98.
126. Judicial review of allegedly unconstitutional prison disciplinary actions may be
obtained by either 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as in the cases decided by the federal district
courts in New York, supra notes 10, 11, 45, or by federal habeas corpus.
Where the prisoner seeks release from allegedly unconstitutional solitary confinement,
as opposed to release from prison, the solitary confinement is "custody" for the purposes of habeas corpus. Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966),
aff'd 393 U.S. 483 (1969). The district court in that case stated:
[T]he relief sought in the present case is, in fact, to release petitioner from
custody of solitary confinement which is, in a sense, a jail within a jail. 252
F. Supp. at 785.
Where the prisoner has not been placed in solitary confinement but has suffered a
loss of good time, the decision in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 5 (1968) would allow
him to attack the administrative decision by federal habeas corpus despite the fact
that he may not have begun to serve that period of incarceration he would not have
had to have served but for the good time loss. Liberally construing the term "custody," the Supreme Court in Rowe allowed the prisoner to challenge the constitutionality of a sentence to be served upon completions of his present one. The court held
that for purposes of federal habeas corpus, "custody comprehends ...
status for
the entire duration of imprisonment" and that the term "custody" should include, "the
aggregate of the sentences imposed . . ." 391 U.S. at 64. Apparently, where the
prisoner must serve a longer period of incarceration than he would have had to had
his good time not been impaired, he may attack the impairment by federal habeas
corpus, his present custody fulfilling the traditional custody requirement.
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